Is science a belief?

[tolman]

I hear an engineer speaking rather than a scientist. Of course science is about speculation rather than application.
Science isn't about speculation. Speculation is merely one aspect of it, in much the same way it's an aspect of engineering - a way of generating ideas that can then be checked out to see whether they seem to work.

The point of science isn't just to generate speculative models of reality for some personal intellectual satisfaction, it's to generate models of reality which seem to be useful (ie which correspond with the real world well enough that they can be used for making accurate predictions with less expense and danger than trying everything out full-scale and in real time).

It's not about just asking "What if?" questions, it's about gaining the knowledge to allow us to accurately answer "What if?" questions.
That's what causes people to pay for science being taught and done.

To the extent that an area of science can't really be checked against reality, it's debatable whether it's really science (in the sense of knowledge), or just potential science.
For example, as long as it was not possible to decide between string theory and various other competing theories by any appeal to the real world, it'd also be basically irrelevant which, if any, may be more or less correct.
No decisions would (or even could) be affected by a suspicion that one or another may be correct, saving possibly those aimed at trying to find a way of distinguishing between them, or guessing how to allocate funds out of a limited budget.


What's the point of it if it isn't - it just becomes engineering, merely playing with the bricks created by someone else.Now, what was that I said about people being patronising?

[Pebble]

I suspected as much - some areas of clinical (because its more medical) is very fluffy with regard to what mainstream psych is all about. However, you should not extrapolate from that limited observation to tarnish a whole discipline od research.

OK so you have not directly stated that medicine is fluffy, but the above statement becomes difficult to comprehend if that was not the inference.




With respect - it will only remain tarned by those making the mistake you just did......the fallacy of the sweeping generalisation perhaps?.

Now back to the real debate.......

The point you have neatly sidestepped here, is that it is the behaviour of card carrying psychologists that is responsible for my perception.

I note that no 'real scientist' is willing to take up the challange of defending the 'paradigm' argument.

[Pebble]

The point of science isn't just to generate speculative models of reality for some personal intellectual satisfaction, it's to generate models of reality which seem to be useful (ie which correspond with the real world well enough that they can be used for making accurate predictions with less expense and danger than trying everything out full-scale and in real time).




'Real academics' claim to pursue knowledge for its own sake considering any potential use to which that knowledge can be put as entirely secondary. This appears to be a dying breed. Survival of the fittest at work?

[tolman]

'Real academics' claim to pursue knowledge for its own sake considering any potential use to which that knowledge can be put as entirely secondary. This appears to be a dying breed. Survival of the fittest at work?
I suppose there's what people claim when pontificating in a common room, and then there's what people claim on grant applications.

Anyway, it's possible to pursue 'pure' knowledge about reality without getting involved in immediate applications, but ideas still needs some cross-checking with reality to ensure you *have* actually gained knowledge and not merely generated speculation.

I'm not sure that many Nobel prizes get awarded for untested theories.

(and I know I'm using 'theory' in the small-T everyday sense, not the strict 'tested hypothesis' sense)

[Matt]

I'm not sure that many Nobel prizes get awarded for untested theories.

But Al Gore got one :cheesy:

</AGW denialist>

[Lord Muck oGentry]

I note that no 'real scientist' is willing to take up the challange of defending the 'paradigm' argument.

Pebble,

I'm sorry to be tedious here. Which argument do you mean by " the 'paradigm' argument"?

Is it an argument meant to show that science moves from paradigm to paradigm, with intervals of upheaval? Or is it an argument meant to show that paradigm-shifts of this sort must be irrational? Or is it something else?

[Pebble]

Pebble,

I'm sorry to be tedious here. Which argument do you mean by " the 'paradigm' argument"?

Is it an argument meant to show that science moves from paradigm to paradigm, with intervals of upheaval? Or is it an argument meant to show that paradigm-shifts of this sort must be irrational? Or is it something else?

As mentioned above everything is a paradigm these days. As I understand the notion, it describes the theory or group of theories that describe the current understanding of a given branch of study.

The notion being proposed (I have not stated that I agree with this) is that most of the time the underlying theory is not challanged. Where anomalies are observed, one assumes that there is some missing data that can reconcile the anomaly with the current theory. Further it is claimed that many anomalies will not be observed as one is generally looking for data that support the theory rather than trying to disprove the theory. Next, it is much easier to get funding for projects that 'flesh out' a given understanding than challange it. Finally, it is much easier to publish findings that accord with current understanding (peer review), observations that challange the current position must be much better supported by evidence than those which accord with the current beliefs.

In essence the whole process is geared to resisting major change, and that there is an unequal playing field. Major changes such as occurred with Darwin, Kepler etc are strongly contested and converting the scientific community is managed better by forceful personalities than by the force of argument alone.

I suspect that this was very true a couple of hundred years ago, and much less so now, but presenting coherent evidence is difficult, especially given the behaviour of Einstein and I believe Schrodinger.

[tolman]

I guess it's often easier to see paradigms in hindsight.
In reality, I'd have thought that things are frequently finer-grained, and that sometimes even small changes can be difficult, whereas larger ones can just happen as a result of evolution, not revolution.

Presumably there are historic reasons/evidence why people think a particular way, so new results/ideas which contradict the current popular theory will have to provide better evidence than those which accord with it, since the non-controversial ideas effectively have the weight of the historic reasons/evidence behind them.

However, I'd wonder how significant the suggestion is of things conflicting with paradigms not being looked for.
At any one time, in a mature discipline where the methods basically work, the large majority of scientists seem likely to be working inside the box doing things which are useful enough for someone else to fund, and few of those are generally going to be hugely groundbreaking, even if they are finding out new things.

How many of the really big shake-ups would have to have happened sooner or later, (often not much later) merely from the slow collection of facts from people *not* trying to think outside the box?

Are there really many people prepared to throw funding around for people simply trying to prove what is already believed true?
Would anyone pay for someone to do that if they didn't have confidence that anomalous results would be reported and investigated?

Surely with Darwin, it was the weight of collected evidence and a chain of reasoning that it was hard to find fault with that counted, rather than personality? Many people who were opposed to the ideas were opposed for reasons which had little to do with science.

With Kepler, he was just trying to explain Brahe's measurements. Was there even an orthodoxy in existence about how planets moved, or just a collection of personal theories based on data of varying accuracy?

[Pebble]

Are there really many people prepared to throw funding around for people simply trying to prove what is already believed true?
Would anyone pay for someone to do that if they didn't have confidence that anomalous results would be reported and investigated?

Surely with Darwin, it was the weight of collected evidence and a chain of reasoning that it was hard to find fault with that counted, rather than personality? Many people who were opposed to the ideas were opposed for reasons which had little to do with science.

With Kepler, he was just trying to explain Brahe's measurements. Was there even an orthodoxy in existence about how planets moved, or just a collection of personal theories based on data of varying accuracy?

In terms of funding, it is clear that the 'great and the good' are the real power brokers in most grant awarding bodies, and these individuals legacy is to a certain extent based upon current theories surviving. Certianly they would not wish to fund individuals that would deliberately falsify results, but those committed to furthering theories to which they themselves are committed are favoured.

As to Darwin>

http://anthro.palomar.edu/evolve/default.htm


This site suggests that evolution was but one of a competing number of possible theories being developed. Darwin is likely to have favoured evolution as the explaination largely as this was his grandfathers (Erasmus Darwin) favourite theory.

Ussher/Lightfoot proposed on biblical research that god had created most species as are.

Ray/Linnaeus codified natural species (much like geneticists are doing now), inadvertently pointing out the similarities between man and apes.

Lamarck propsed inheritance of acquired characteristics

While Darwin propsed 'surivial of the fittest'

Certainly Darwind theory holds up best to skeptical analysis, but hardly the straight line suggested in retrospect.

As for Kepler, not really my area, but as I understand it the Platonic theory (or perhaps vision) had stood unchallanged for 2000 years, so certainly accepted orthrodoxy.

I certainly remember the belief from pulmonary hypertension that vasospasm, led to vascular rigidity and ultimatley being replaced by proliferation of vascular fibrostic cells causing irreversible heart failure, was only very grudgingly replaced by and acknowledgement that the vasoreactive component was only demostrable in a tiny minority of patients, and that in most the proliferative phase was probably the initiating pathological abnormality. This had massive implications for drug development, treatment approach and research direction. It was certainly resisted long after the evidence base for the vasomotor theory was considerably less well supported than any other possible theory, but as that was the standard, the evidence base required to move on was greater than that supported by history alone.

[tolman]

With planetary motion, once accurate data was collected, it was clear that motion wasn't circular. Whatever someone had been taught to believe, if their belief caused them to predict a planet being in one spot and it was actually elsewhere, they'd have to accept there was something wrong.

One could look at Kepler and say "Look - as soon as Brahe's really accurate measurements were available, someone could work away, dismiss theories that didn't work, and eventually come up with a good solution. If it hadn't been him, it would have been somebody else, and probably fairly soon afterwards"

I'm confused what the point is supposed to be re: Darwin, since there doesn't seem to have been some existing monolithic paradigm for him to fight against, and many of the threads of his ideas weren't novel, even if the coherent synthesis of ideas in one solid theory backed by evidence was.
To quite an extent, what both drew significant support and also annoyed those with emotional reasons to want him to be wrong was that it was extraordinarily hard to argue against the basic premises of what was at heart a very clear and simple theory. About the best you could do was go Lamarckian or something and argue that descent-with-modification doesn't happen.

When it comes to medicine, I suppose it does tend to be rather more 'traditional', but medicine isn't just science, it's science with lots of things added.
I imagine the thought "Have I really been unknowingly giving a poor treatment for the last 30 years?" may make doctors hope that little bit more that a new idea is wrong. (There aren't many other areas of science where people dying wouldn't be assumed to be an explicit failure of some kind, rather than something which often just happens.)

[Lord Muck oGentry]

As mentioned above everything is a paradigm these days. As I understand the notion, it describes the theory or group of theories that describe the current understanding of a given branch of study.

The notion being proposed (I have not stated that I agree with this) is that most of the time the underlying theory is not challanged. Where anomalies are observed, one assumes that there is some missing data that can reconcile the anomaly with the current theory. Further it is claimed that many anomalies will not be observed as one is generally looking for data that support the theory rather than trying to disprove the theory. Next, it is much easier to get funding for projects that 'flesh out' a given understanding than challange it. Finally, it is much easier to publish findings that accord with current understanding (peer review), observations that challange the current position must be much better supported by evidence than those which accord with the current beliefs.

Fair enough, Pebble.

Let me offer some chuntering.
First: I suppose that Okasha is referring to the literature generated by Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This is probably obvious to those who have posted so far, but it may be useful to lurkers.
Second: I suppose that Okasha must have referred to the symposium Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ( ed. Lakatos and Musgrave). Here is a link:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatos
Third: if anything at all counts as a paradigm, Newtonian physics does. It unified Galileo's terrestrial physics with Kepler's celestial physics, correcting both and exhibiting them as special cases. It enjoyed great success in practice— up to, and including, putting bods on the Moon. As Damon Runyon might have said: if this is not a paradigm, it will do until a paradigm comes along.

On to the question about paradigms and rationality.
Here is the often-told story about the discovery of Neptune, prompted by the observation of perturbations in the orbit of Uranus:
http://www.bookrags.com/research/leverrier-adams-and-the-mathematica-scit-0512345/
Were Leverrier and Adams lucky? IMO, yes.
Were they therefore irrational? IMO, no.
Perhaps I'm missing something, but it seems obvious that deciding questions within paradigms can be rational.

What about deciding questions between paradigms? Well, I'd be happier about that question if I knew what it meant.
@ Pebble. Can you cast some light on this? ( On touche toujours sur le cheval qui tire)

[Pebble]

Fair enough, Pebble.

Let me offer some chuntering.
I suppose that Okasha must have referred to the symposium Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ( ed. Lakatos and Musgrave). Here is a link:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatos

@ Pebble. Can you cast some light on this? ( On touche toujours sur le cheval qui tire)

Thanks for the link, this does actually address the precise question I was asking. It is of course only a theory, but one that provides a rational way of describing the apparently irrational behaviour of scientists.

Falsificationism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsificationism), (Popper (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper)'s theory), proposed that scientists put forward theories and that nature 'shouts NO' in the form of an inconsistent observation. According to Popper, it is irrational for scientists to maintain their theories in the face of Natures rejection, yet this is what Kuhn had described them as doing. But for Lakatos, "It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO rather we propose a maze of theories and nature may shout INCONSISTENT"[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatos#cite_note-2). This inconsistency can be resolved without abandoning our Research Programme by leaving the hard core alone and altering the auxiliary hypotheses. One example given is Newton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton)'s three laws of motion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_laws_of_motion). Within the Newtonian system (research programme) these are not open to falsification as they form the programme's hard core. This research programme provides a framework within which research can be undertaken with constant reference to presumed first principles which are shared by those involved in the research programme, and without continually defending these first principles. In this regard it is similar to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm.
Lakatos also believed that a research programme contained 'methodological rules', some that instruct on what paths of research to avoid (he called this the 'negative heuristic') and some that instruct on what paths to pursue (he called this the 'positive heuristic').
Lakatos claimed that not all changes of the auxiliary hypotheses within research programmes (Lakatos calls them 'problem shifts') are equally as acceptable. He believed that these 'problem shifts' can be evaluated both by their ability to explain apparent refutations and by their ability to produce new facts. If it can do this then Lakatos claims they are progressive[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatos#cite_note-3). However if they do not, if they are just '' changes that do not lead to the prediction of new facts, then he labels them as degenerate.
Lakatos believed that if a research programme is progressive, then it is rational for scientists to keep changing the auxiliary hypotheses in order to hold on to it in the face of anomalies. However, if a research programme is degenerate, then it faces danger from its competitors, it can be 'falsified' by being superseded by a better (i.e. more progressive) research programme. This is what he believes is happening in the historical periods Kuhn describes as revolutions and what makes them rational as opposed to mere leaps of faith (as he believed Kuhn took them to be).


Can now leave the dead horse alone.

[tolman]

A new idea doesn't have to be accepted as 'probably true' in order for people to be interested in it. Even people who are deeply skeptical may still investigate claims to see what happens, whether it's to try and find out where the claimant went wrong, or to see if some other new ideas may result from the examination.

Think of what happened with Cold Fusion - lots of people thinking "Looks like a load of bollocks, but I'd better check it out", and I don't think that was all down to the lure of possible applications, but also to the interest in someone suggesting something not previously thought likely was possible.

[Dr B]

OK so you have not directly stated that medicine is fluffy, but the above statement becomes difficult to comprehend if that was not the inference.

No it does not - I was relating to medically orientated quarters of psychology. Anyway, it's irrelevant as it was your initial claim against psychology that I challenged. I mentioned the medical-psychology stuff purely becasue I thought that was what you were basing your sweeping and hasty genmeralisation on. I would concur with you about problems in those areas - but they are not representative of mainstream academic psychology.




The point you have neatly sidestepped here, is that it is the behaviour of card carrying psychologists that is responsible for my perception.


No - i side stepped nothing and it is clear that your perception is based in your own ill-informed position and is not the fault of anyone else. This I hinted at above so I fail to see the side-stepping.

Your perception is common - but ill informed. That is the only point I am making.



I note that no 'real scientist' is willing to take up the challange of defending the 'paradigm' argument.

What nonsense - read the archives.........

[Mulder]

Psychology has a problem few other sciences suffer from.

In physics, it is possible to say what an atom will do in certain circumstances. In chemistry most reactions are predictable in given conditions. Even in biology, cells operate fairly predictably.

In psychology, however, you are dealing with a range of human behaviour which varies across the population. You cannot really predict with certainty what any individual will do in given circumstances, only what some or most will do. Indeed, crowds tend to be much more predictable than individuals. I think this can make psychology seem a bit fluffy sometimes.

[Matt]

In psychology, however, you are dealing with a range of human behaviour which varies across the population. You cannot really predict with certainty what any individual will do in given circumstances, only what some or most will do. Indeed, crowds tend to be much more predictable than individuals. I think this can make psychology seem a bit fluffy sometimes.

Actuially that sounds a lot like statistical physics, typically portrayed as one of the "hard" sciences.

[Mulder]

Actuially that sounds a lot like statistical physics, typically portrayed as one of the "hard" sciences.

Except that in physics, the 'individuals' (like molecules in a gas) simply reflect a range of physical states whereas crowds act more like collections of cellular automata exhibiting emergent order. :smiley:

There are often parallels between sciences ...

[Dr B]

Psychology has a problem few other sciences suffer from.

In physics, it is possible to say what an atom will do in certain circumstances. In chemistry most reactions are predictable in given conditions. Even in biology, cells operate fairly predictably.

In psychology, however, you are dealing with a range of human behaviour which varies across the population. You cannot really predict with certainty what any individual will do in given circumstances, only what some or most will do. Indeed, crowds tend to be much more predictable than individuals. I think this can make psychology seem a bit fluffy sometimes.

It's the complexity of some of the issues that arguably make it a harder science than those not educated in it realise.

By the way - physics and psychology are both (logically speaking) probabilistic. While I agree with the essence of your point and some quarters of physics are well defined, to a higher level, so are many areas of psychology.

There are many aspects of vision, perception (i.e., illusions etc) attention and memory that occur realiably enough that it would be perverse to think these principles are not common in the brains of observers. Attentional failures, memory confabulations, etc are all so well established that their existence is now beyond question and the search is on for the mechanisms.

I think it all depends on the type of psychology you take as your model. I agree that fluffy areas like many quarters of social psychology are very problematic. However, they are still a science in the true sense of the word (but not my cup ot tea).

Psychiatry and some quarters of clinical psychology are not what i would call science.....but some aspects of these areas have more credibility than others so it gets very complicated very quickly.

My point is you cannot take sheldrake and criticise biology as a science because of him. You cannot take the fluffy areas of psychology and generalise to the larger academic field as a whole.

[Pebble]

I mentioned the medical-psychology stuff purely becasue I thought that was what you were basing your sweeping and hasty genmeralisation on. I would concur with you about problems in those areas - but they are not representative of mainstream academic psychology.


No - i side stepped nothing and it is clear that your perception is based in your own ill-informed position and is not the fault of anyone else.

Your perception is common - but ill informed. That is the only point I am making.

What nonsense - ..


Obviously a very sensitive issue. Perhaps you would be so kind as to point me in the direction of some of the high quality research in the field. I have seen plenty of animal work and population based work, which is fine as far as it goes. Also some of the work on individuals with specific neurological lesions is good. But from what you are implying there is much more that I am unaware of.

As to the issue of side stepping, if large numbers of doctors are behaving poorly, then I expect medicine in general to take the rap, and sort them out. The same is true of police, soldiers, priests etc. As a profession one must accept the consequences of having members that practice voodoo or whatever in your name.
If I accept your argument then, the catholic church is right to dis-own the priests who abused their position over years and were covered for by the hierarchy. They can simply point out that these individuals are not truly representative of the word of god, and their actions cannot be used to discredit that. WHile this is a technically correct point, it is emblematic of a failure to confront the real problem.

[Tim the Mage]

The problem for psychologists is the same as that facing other "social scientists" in that the efforts to act scientifically are undermined by:

1) People claiming to be psychologists (or sociologists or economists or marketing behaviour experts or psephologists) who reject quantitative analysis as somehow not revealing enough
2) The difficulties in conducting closed experiments in social sciences (I think also these are difficult and boring compared to running focus groups)
3) Preference for anthropological methods of research (e.g. participant observer methods) over anything involving number crunching

Parts of this are quite difficult to overcome (although it surprises me that the well established experimental tradition in academic marketing seems to be largely ignored by academic sociologists studying essentialy the same phenomena).

Thus (and this is a common example) some sociologists dismiss the statistical evidence on the benefits of two parent families in preference for qualitative studies and case studies of successful and positive intervention with single parents.

I also think distinctions need to be made between different 'branches' of psychology - in my experience clinical psychologists (despite being mostly slightly loopy) are very cautious in their conclusions when compared to organisational and social psychologists whose capacity for the sweeping generalisation is quite striking. Indeed the widespread use of psychometric testing (which I'm sure, like lie detectors, can be fixed) should be worrying. Some of the tests seem good and supportive but others are only a slight imprvement of casting augeries or using horoscopes.

[tolman]

I guess the problem is that much of the visible side of psychology, apart from dramatic protrayals of criminal profilers, etc. comes from people in the media either saying things that seems odd or things where most people would think "I could have told you that for nothing!".

I suppose it doesn't help that psychology can also end up being linked in some people's perceptions with psychiatry and/or psychotherapy, with people either seeing them as largely similar (with the ever present couch and bad European accent), or thinking that maybe psychology is just a poor relation of psychiatry.

From my point of view, I'd tend to see the lower-level side of things (perception, etc) as essentially neuroscience/neurophysiology, and consider that distinct from 'psychology'.
However, that could be unfair in that as soon as something's reliably demonstrated to happen, unless it's a terribly subjective or high-level property of the brain, it gets whisked off into a different category.


Indeed the widespread use of psychometric testing (which I'm sure, like lie detectors, can be fixed) should be worrying. Some of the tests seem good and supportive but others are only a slight imprvement of casting augeries or using horoscopes.
Am I just being cynical, or is one of the reasons for using psychometric tests to give people another possible excuse for justifying their choice of candidate - if they want someone, they ignore the test if not favourable, if they don't want someone, they try and find some convenient excuse for not employing them.
I can't help wondering if the prevalence of graphology in French employment screening is mainly to give an extra possible reason for someone to reject people who didn't go to the same great university as they did, or who was otherwise 'unsuitable'.

[Dr B]

Obviously a very sensitive issue. Perhaps you would be so kind as to point me in the direction of some of the high quality research in the field. I have seen plenty of animal work and population based work, which is fine as far as it goes. Also some of the work on individuals with specific neurological lesions is good. But from what you are implying there is much more that I am unaware of.


Not a sensitive issue at all - just addressing a factual error. In terms of other areas - these areas should keep you going for a while

Cognitive science
Cognitive Psychology
Neuropsychology (brain-damaged patient work)
Neuroscience (PET / fMRI)
Neurophysiology (EEG / ERP)
Developmental Psychology & Developmental Neuroscience
Psychophysics (vision & action)



As to the issue of side stepping, if large numbers of doctors are behaving poorly, then I expect medicine in general to take the rap, and sort them out. The same is true of police, soldiers, priests etc. As a profession one must accept the consequences of having members that practice voodoo or whatever in your name.

But large numbers of those working in those disciplines above are not behaving in that way - maybe you could give lots of examples (and not counting known woo's who, to my mind do not work in these central fields as a whole; i.e., fenwick)



If I accept your argument then, the catholic church is right to dis-own the priests who abused their position over years and were covered for by the hierarchy. They can simply point out that these individuals are not truly representative of the word of god, and their actions cannot be used to discredit that. WHile this is a technically correct point, it is emblematic of a failure to confront the real problem.

No - not at all. I merely pointed out that you have made a hasty generalisation and one that does not stand up to scrutiny. Dont forget, I am agreeing with you in part - but only in relation to the fringe psychiatric field - which as i have been saying all along is not mainstream academic psychology (it's a different field) - so it cannot be used as a criticism.

I agree with you that psychology gets a bad rap because of those other areas - but those other areas are often totally unrelated to psychology as an experimental science. Maybe the fact that both sciences start with the same letters is confusing to some 8)

I doubt anyone can tackle the real point if they don't appreciate the object being discussed in an accurate manner

[Dr B]

Hi Tim

Nice post and I generally concur....


The problem for psychologists is the same as that facing other "social scientists" in that the efforts to act scientifically are undermined by:

1) People claiming to be psychologists (or sociologists or economists or marketing behaviour experts or psephologists) who reject quantitative analysis as somehow not revealing enough

This is rare if ever to my mind. I have only worked in one department that had a qualitative psychologist - and she has now retired and not been replaced by a similar other. Off the top of my head I guess I have worked with 200 psychologists (in terms of the departments I have worked in and studied in) and that is the only instance. So to my mind, it is not representative of mainstream academic psychology.



2) The difficulties in conducting closed experiments in social sciences (I think also these are difficult and boring compared to running focus groups)


Not sure what you mean here



3) Preference for anthropological methods of research (e.g. participant observer methods) over anything involving number crunching

Nop.....dont know of this being common either.....either with me, or colleagues far and wide. Dont get me wrong - I think your point is fine as and where it happens but its not the norm or even the mainstream



Parts of this are quite difficult to overcome (although it surprises me that the well established experimental tradition in academic marketing seems to be largely ignored by academic sociologists studying essentialy the same phenomena).


Sociology has nothing to do with psychology - they are separate disciplines on the whole.



Thus (and this is a common example) some sociologists dismiss the statistical evidence on the benefits of two parent families in preference for qualitative studies and case studies of successful and positive intervention with single parents.


Excellent example - but thats sociology again - not psychology (cool example though. 8)



I also think distinctions need to be made between different 'branches' of psychology - in my experience clinical psychologists (despite being mostly slightly loopy) are very cautious in their conclusions when compared to organisational and social psychologists whose capacity for the sweeping generalisation is quite striking.

Absolutely - I did make this point much earlier but I think it has been overlooked. Hasty generalisations have a habit of doing that.



Indeed the widespread use of psychometric testing (which I'm sure, like lie detectors, can be fixed) should be worrying. Some of the tests seem good and supportive but others are only a slight imprvement of casting augeries or using horoscopes.

There is no widesread use of these in academic psychology (again - as an experimental science). I know psychometrics tries to align itself with psychology (for prestige) but we all think its bollocks and always have.....O0

[Dr B]

Could I also add that its best not to confuse 'folk psychology' and the type of person you may encounter on day-time TV :cheesy: (generally....) talking about pet psychology as indexing, in any way, the scientific field of psychology.

[Dr B]

There is a further point I would like to make about one aspect that does make Psychology marginally different from psychics / biology etc. However, this difference does not mean any of these areas do not constitute science - rather it is an important observation

In psychology it can be the case that opinion is divide on central issues for decades. There are psychologist who argue strongly that there is no such thing as autism, schizophrenia, dyslexia and so on. However, these arguments are not necessarily invalidating every study in these areas - they are merely pointing out that the collection of observations we call 'autism' (for example) are slightly illusory and we may need to generate new ways to think about this.

I find this a strength in psychology and not a weakness (as long as it is not applied incorrectly).

There are debates as to whether we should think of visual imagery as strickly visual (Pylyshyn vs Kosslyn) whether cognition really requires representation (the dynamic view), whether attention is top-down or bottom-up, whether attention requires inhibition or just mechanisms devoted to saliency processing and so on. Some of these are large reaching theoretical debates and some are smaller ones occuring within specific domains. But I would contend that it is debates like these that help to make a science.

There are controversial aspects within psychology - which happen at a level that do not occur in other sciences - but that does not make it unscientific.